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A fruitful approach to the understanding the human awareness of action is the study of
those pathologies in which some aspects of it are altered. Previous evidences showed
that patients with schizophrenia tend to attribute someone else’ actions to their own,
as internally, rather than externally, generated. Here, we asked whether schizophrenics
have an “excessive” sense of agency, while observing others’ movements. We took
advantage from the circles-lines task, known to show bimanual interferences. Twenty
schizophrenics and 20 age-matched healthy controls were administered: (a) the
bimanual version of the task: drawing lines with one hand and circles with the other;
and (b) a modified version: drawing lines while observing the examiner drawing circles.
In the bimanual version, patients and controls showed a comparable interference
effect. In the observation version, schizophrenics, compared to controls, showed a
significantly greater interference effect of the examiners’ hand drawing circles on the
own hand drawing lines. This effect was significantly correlated to the strength of the
positive symptoms (hallucinations and delusions) and to the alteration of the sense
of agency, reported during the task. These findings suggest that an altered sense of
agency, as shown by schizophrenics, can induce objective consequences on the motor
system.
Keywords: schizophrenia, positive symptoms, sense of body-ownership, sense of agency, bimanual coupling
effect
INTRODUCTION
Despite the subjective experience of willed actions having a unitary nature, converging evidence
in cognitive neuroscience have clearly pinpointed that conscious awareness of actions has
a rich and multifaceted signature, and can be dissociated in different components. To this
respect, a fundamental approach to the understanding of human awareness of action is the
study of those pathological conditions, such as schizophrenia, in which some aspects of it are
altered.
Schizophrenia is a well-known widespread mental disease characterized by a variety of signs and
symptoms, which are differentially expressed across patients and through the course of the illness.
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Symptoms include characteristic distortions of thinking and
perception, cognitive impairments, motor abnormalities,
avolition and apathy, difficulties in communication, and
restricted affective expression. These abnormalities are generally
classified into positive, negative, cognitive, disorganization,
mood, and motor symptom dimensions (Tandon et al., 2009).
Within positive symptoms dimension, Schneider conceptualized
First Rank Symptoms which are self-disturbances including
passivity experiences or delusions of controls, in which the
individual has the experience of the mind or body being under
the influence or control of some kind of external force or agency
(Schneider, 1959). This altered conscious awareness of action
has been explained within the well-established forward model of
motor control (Wolpert et al., 1995; Blakemore and Frith, 2003).
The model states that when motor predictions match sensory
consequences, the movement is perceived as one’s own. On
the contrary, when there is a mismatch, the sense of being the
agent of that action (i.e., sense of agency) decreases. According
to this model, patients with schizophrenia are unable to create
predictions of willed actions and, hence, experience movements
as generated by external forces (Frith, 1992; Frith et al., 2000a,b;
Blakemore et al., 2002; Lindner et al., 2005).
Such interpretation of a reduced sense of agency based
on clinical symptoms, however, cannot easily explain those
evidences showing that, in some experimental contexts,
schizophrenics show, on the opposite, a hyper-sense of agency.
Within this line of research, a first approach consists in asking
participants to explicitly indicate how much they sense a feeling
of control and of authorship over an externally generated action
they can see on a screen. Previous literature employed these
kinds of tasks in patients with schizophrenia, introducing,
with a variety of techniques, temporal or spatial distortion
of the visual feedbacks (i.e., body movements). Essentially,
those studies showed that patients are inaccurate and tend
to attribute what is seen to them, a sort of over-attribution
of agency (Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Synofzik
et al., 2010). The second experimental approach to the study
of agency in schizophrenics, involves implicit measures as,
for instance, the temporal binding paradigm known to show
in healthy participants that voluntary action and its sensory
consequences bind each other in time (Haggard and Eimer,
1999; Haggard et al., 2002). The studies which administered
this paradigm to patients affected by schizophrenia (Haggard
et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010) showed that they have stronger
binding effects respect to the healthy population. In other words,
their altered sense of agency consists in perceiving their own
actions as having exaggerated causal effects on the external
world.
In the present study, we proposed a new approach for
studying the sense of agency in schizophrenia, asking whether, in
these patients, an altered sense of agency may have consequences
on the patients’ motor parameters. This working hypothesis was
based on previous data recently obtained on neurological patients
showing a monothematic delusion of body ownership (Garbarini
and Pia, 2013; Garbarini et al., 2013b, 2014, 2015a; Pia et al.,
2013). Specifically, whenever someone else’s hand is located in
a 1st person perspective and in a body-congruent position, these
patients falsely misattribute to themselves this latter hand as well
as its movements. In other words, this means that when the
sense of body ownership is altered, so that the alien hand is
embodied, the sense of agency is altered as well. Moreover, this
altered sense of agency is so deeply embedded within patients’
motor system as to affect even their motor performance. To
study this delusion of body ownership, Garbarini et al. (2014)
employed a modified version of circles-lines task known to show
bimanual interferences in healthy subjects. When people have
to draw lines with one hand while drawing circles with the
other hand, each movement interferes with the other one and
both trajectories tend to become ovals (curved lines or line-like
circles); i.e., bimanual coupling effect (Franz, 1997; Garbarini
et al., 2012, 2013a, 2015b; Piedimonte et al., 2014). Patients
with delusion had to draw lines with their intact hand while
watching an alien hand (the examiner’s one) performing circles
(Garbarini et al., 2013b). When the alien hand drew circles,
patients misidentified the hand as their own (i.e., altered sense
of body ownership), misattributed its movements to themselves
(i.e., altered sense of agency) and displayed a clear coupling
effect (comparable to that found in normal individuals actually
performing the bimanual task). It is important to note that, in the
same condition, neither healthy controls nor hemiplegic patients
without embodiment showed any coupling effect. This suggests
that simply looking at a hand drawing circles is not sufficient to
induce line ovalization.
Based on this previous evidence, in the present study we
reasoned that this modified version of the circles-lines task
(drawing lines while observing the examiner’s hand drawing
circles) would have allowed us to make clear predictions respect
to our main question in patients with schizophrenia. Does, in
those patients, an altered sense of agency over the observed
movement induces objective consequences on the patients’
motor performance? If patients with schizophrenia, particularly
those with first-rank symptoms such as hallucinations and
delusions (Daprati et al., 1997; Voss et al., 2010), have an
‘‘excessive’’ sense of agency, they would bemore likely to perceive
externally generated circles (drown by the examiner) as internally
generated, as if they had to perform the bimanual task with
both hands. Therefore, compared to controls, they should show a
greater interference effect of someone else’s hand drawing circles
on the own hand drawing lines.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The study has been conducted at the Department of
Neuroscience, University of Turin, Struttura Semplice di
Coordinamento a Valenza Dipartimentale (SSCVD) and at
the Psychiatric Emergency Service (PES), Department of
Neuroscience and Mental Health, A.O. Città della Salute e della
Scienza di Torino—Presidio Molinette, Turin, during the period
between January and June 2015.
For the study 40 participants were recruited, 20 patients with
schizophrenia (10 females/10 males; mean age= 46.7, SD= 14.7)
and 20 age-matched healthy controls (10 females/10 males; mean
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TABLE 1 | Patients’ demographic (a) and clinical (b) features.
Patients Acute patients Stable patients Controls
(a) Demographic characteristics
Sample (N) 20 10 10 20
Gender 10 M; 10 F 6 M; 4 F 4 M; 6 F 10 M; 10 F
Age (years) 46.7 ± 14.7 49 ± 12.6 44.4 ± 16.9 45.2 ± 12.4
Education (years) 12 ± 3.9 11.3 ± 3.7 12.6 ± 4.1 13 ± 3.4
(b) Psychiatric assessment
Onset of schizophrenia (years) 26.4 ± 12.3 28.8 ± 16.1 23.9 ± 6.7 –
Duration of illness (years) 20.3 ± 13.6 20.2 ± 8 20.4 ± 18.1 –
CPZ equivalent (mg/die) 551.8 ± 464.5 707.4 ± 536.6 396.2 ± 340.7 –
SAPS global∗ 31.3 ± 27.4 51.4 ± 24.7 11.2 ± 8.9 –
(a) Hallucinations∗ 5.3 ± 7.9 9.3 ± 9.4 1.2 ± 2.7 –
(b) Delusions∗ 11.2 ± 10.8 19.7 ± 8.5 2.6 ± 3.7 –
(c) Bizarre Behavior∗ 5.3 ± 4.1 7.6 ± 2.9 2.9 ± 3.7 –
(d) Positive Formal Thought Disorder∗ 9.7 ± 8 14.8 ± 7.1 4.5 ± 5.3 –
SANS global 51.3 ± 23.7 59.8 ± 17 42.7 ± 27.1 –
(a) Affective Flattening or Blunting 15.4 ± 6.6 17 ± 4.3 13.7 ± 8.1 –
(b) Alogia 9 ± 5.8 9.9 ± 4.6 8 ± 6.9 –
(c) Avolition—Apathy∗ 8.4 ± 5.1 10.7 ± 3.8 6 ± 5.3 –
(d) Anhedonia—Asociality 12.5 ± 6.3 13.8 ± 5.4 11.1 ± 7.2 –
(e) Attention∗ 6.2 ± 3.9 8.4 ± 2.5 3.9 ± 3.8 –
∗ Indicate a significant difference (p < 0.05, Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test) between acute and stable patients.
age = 45.2; SD = 12.4). All participants were right-handed
according to the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Within
the patients’ group, 10 acute inpatients, were recruited from PES;
10 stable outpatients, were recruited from SSCVD.
Patients all fulfilled formal Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric
Association, 2000) diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia.
The diagnosis of schizophrenia was determined by treating
psychiatrists and was confirmed by two expert clinicians (P.R.,
M.S.) using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
disorders (SCID; First, 2015). Patients’ demographic and
clinical features are shown in Table 1. Subjects were excluded
if they had a current disorder other than schizophrenia, a
current or past co-diagnosis of autistic disorder or another
pervasive developmental disorder, a history of severe head
injury (coma ≥48 h), or a diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder
due to a general medical condition. All the patients were
receiving antipsychotic medication at the time of assessment.
All the patients included in the study were treated with
second-generation antipsychotics (SGAs; Table 2). None of
the patients were receiving anticholinergic drugs at the time
of assessment. In order to evaluate and exclude the effects of
drug-induced EPS, patients were evaluated with the Modified
Simpson-Angus Scale (MSAS; Simpson and Angus, 1970). The
mean rating (± SD) of MSAS in our sample of patients was
2.6 ± 3.61, showing absence or minimal degree of movement
disorder.
Twenty healthy control subjects with no history of
neurological or psychiatric disease volunteered for this study.
The two groups, patients with schizophrenia and healthy
control, were matched for age, sex and handedness. Written
informed consent was obtained from all subjects after a
complete description of the study. The study was performed
in accordance to the ethical standards of the Declaration of
TABLE 2 | Patients drug intake.
Daily dose
N Drug Range Mean
patients (active principle) (mg) (mg)
6 Aripiprazole 10–30 20
2 Clozapine 400–600 500
3 Olanzapine 2.5–20; 10–20 15
4 Paliperidone 9–12 11.25
2 Quetiapine 200–800 500
6 Risperidone 1–5 3
1 Ziprasidone 120 120
Helsinki and was approved by our Local Research Ethics
Commitee (LREC; AOU Città della Salute e della Scienza, Turin,
Italy).
Psychiatric Assessment
Current levels of psychopathological symptoms were assessed
using the Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms
(SANS; Andreasen, 1984a) and the Scale for the Assessment
of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984b). We decided
to use SAPS and SANS for the assessment of psychopathology
because we decided to focus on positive and negative symptoms
of schizophrenia. Furthermore, this type of choice would
allow us to a better comparison with previous results in the
literature.
The SANS measures negative symptoms and consists of
22 items divided into five subscales (Affective Flattening or
Blunting, Alogia, Avolition-Apathy, Anhedonia-Asociality, and
Attention). A global score for each subscale intended to
summarize all of the symptoms within a subscale category is
also included. A semi-structured interview is used to make some
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of the item ratings, with additional ratings based on direct
behavioral observation.
The SAPS consists of 34 items divided into four positive
symptom subscales: hallucinations, delusions, bizarre behavior,
and positive formal thought disorder. As with the SANS, each
subscale also includes a global rating scale.
SANS and SAPS global and subscales scores are shown in
Table 1.
Circles-Lines Coupling Task
Participants were asked to perform unimanual and bimanual
movements, continuously drawing vertical lines and/or circles
without interruptions for 12 s for each trial. The subjects sat on a
chair with both hands lying on the table on which a tablet PC was
positioned to the right of the subject’s sagittal midline. The view
of the right handwas blocked with a cardboard panel and subjects
were explicitly requested to focalize the attention on the left side.
In all conditions, the right hand trajectories were automatically
recorded by the tablet PC whereas, in bimanual or observation
conditions (see below), the left hand had to draw on a sheet of
paper. In the alien conditions, also an alien hand (the examiner’s
one) was on the table. It was a left alien hand aligned with the
patient’s left shoulder, that is in a congruent position with respect
to the patient’s trunk midline, between the patient’s body and the
patient’s left hand (observation circle condition). A white sheet
was used to cover the patients’ and the examiner’s arms. It is
worth noting that in all conditions the subject’s left hand was
visible on the table. As shown in Figure 1, in the experimental
design, there were one baseline condition and two experimental
conditions:
1. Baseline Unimanual Lines (UL): participants were asked to
draw lines with the unseen right hand;
2. Bimanual Circles and Lines (BCL): participants were asked
to simultaneously draw lines with the unseen right hand and
circles with the left hand;
3. Observation Circles (OC): participants were asked to draw
lines with the unseen right hand and to observe the alien left
hand drawing circles.
In the experimental procedure there were 10 trials for each
condition, for a total of 30 trials. We used the following balanced
sequence: UL; BCL; OC; OC; BCL; UL.
Instrumented Analysis of Bimanual
Coupling During Drawing
An Ovalization Index (OI) was calculated, according to previous
studies (see Garbarini et al., 2012, 2013a, 2015b; Piedimonte
et al., 2014), as the standard deviation (SD) of the right-
hand trajectories in relation to an absolute vertical line. For
a throughout description of the steps involved in calculating
the OI refer to Garbarini et al. (2012). Briefly, OI index ranges
between a value of 0 for straight trajectories without any sign
of ovalization and a value of 100 for circular trajectories. The
amount of interference of the left (own or alien) hand executing
circles on the right hand executing lines is shown as an increase
of the OI (bimanual coupling/interference effect) compared to
the baseline UL.
Ownership and Agency “Online”
Evaluation in Patients With Schizophrenia
In order to evaluate the patients’ sense of body-ownership and
sense of agency, during theOC condition in which the examiner’s
hand drew circles, at the end of each block of five trials, an
ownership/agency questionnaire was administered. Patients were
asked to answer using a 7-point Likert scale from −3 (i.e., I
don’t agree at all) to 3 (i.e., I totally agree) if they were in
agreement/disagreement with the following statements:
1. ‘‘I felt as if the alien hand was my hand’’ (Body-ownership
statement)
FIGURE 1 | Graphical representation of the experimental paradigm. From left to right: (A) baseline condition where patients performed lines with their right
hand (UL); (B) bimanual circles-lines condition where patients performed line with their right hand and simultaneously performed circles with their left hand (BCL);
(C) observation condition where patients performed lines with their right hand while simultaneously watching circles performed by an alien hand (in dark gray in the
figure) in their right egocentric peri-personal space (OC). To be noted that in all three conditions, participants had to watch on their left peri-personal egocentric space
and vision of their right hand was precluded by a paper separator.
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FIGURE 2 | Examples of the right hand trajectories in schizophrenic case (below) and a control subject (above) in Unimanual Lines (UL), Bimanual
Circles and Lines (BCL) and Observation Circles (OC) conditions. The Ovalization Index (OI) is reported inside each of the plots, at bottom left, and in BCL and
OC conditions it is reported, at bottom right, also the percent ratio relative to the UL condition. Both control and case show the expected ovalization in the BCL
condition, but, when considering the Observative condition, only the case shows a residual ovalization.
2. ‘‘The alien hand moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was
obeying my will’’ (Agency statement).
These statements were adopted from existing questionnaires
used in traditional rubber hand illusion experiments (Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2012).
Statistical Analysis
For each participant, the OI mean value for the experimental
BCL and OC conditions was expressed as percentage of
the baseline UL condition (BCL% = [OIBCL/OIUL]∗100;
OC% = [OIOC/OIUL]∗100). The obtained values were
analyzed by using unpaired t-tests (two tailed), to compare
patients and controls during both BCL and OC conditions.
Furthermore, in patients with schizophrenia, unpaired
t-tests (two tailed) were used to compare acute and stable
patients in both BCL and OC conditions. A paired t-test
(two tailed) was used to compare the patients’ performance
in BCL and OC conditions. Finally, in patients, we estimated
the correlations (Pearson’s r) between the BCL/OC% of
the baseline, SAPS and SANS global and subscales scores
and the ratings obtained from the ownership/agency
questionnaire.
RESULTS
Comparison Between Patients and
Controls During the Bimanual Task
When controls and schizophrenics were asked to perform the
bimanual circles-lines task, the expected coupling effect was
evident as a clear ovalization of the line trajectories, performed
by the right hand, due to the interference of the circles
simultaneously performed by the left hand. See examples in
Figure 2.
The statistical comparison between patients and controls
during BCL condition indicates no significant difference between
the two groups (BCL% of baseline mean ± SD; Controls:
265.09 ± 102.38; Patients: 287.06 ± 147.95; T = −0.54, p = 0.58,
Unpaired t-test, two tailed; see Figure 3).
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FIGURE 3 | Results from the comparison between schizophrenics and
controls during BCL condition. On the y axis, the OI of the BCL condition
(bimanual circles and lines expressed as % of the baseline condition
(unimanual lines condition). Black bars represent patients’ conditions while
gray bars represent controls conditions. Error bars represent standard errors
of the mean (SEMs).
When comparing acute and stable patients, no difference
was found during BCL condition (BCL% of baseline
mean ± SD; Acute Patients: 257.36 ± 118.85; Stable Patients:
272.82 ± 89.1; T = −0.32, p = 0.74, Unpaired t-test, two
tailed).
Comparison Between Patients and
Controls During the Observation Task
During the observation version of the circles-lines task, a stronger
coupling effect was evident in patients than in controls, as a
greater ovalization of the line trajectories, performed by the right
hand, due to the interference of the circles performed by the
examiner’s left hand. See examples in Figure 2.
The statistical comparison between patients and controls
during OC condition indicates significant difference between
the two groups (OC% of baseline mean ± SD; Controls:
97.34 ± 16.94; Patients: 113.82 ± 25.46; T = −2.75, p < 0.01,
Unpaired t-test, two tailed; see Figure 4).
When comparing acute and stable patients, no difference
was found during OC condition (OC% of baseline mean ± SD;
Acute Patients: 118.21 ± 28.04; Stable Patients: 109.43 ± 23.22;
T = 0.76, p = 0.45, Unpaired t-test, two tailed).
In both patients and controls, when comparing the obtained
values in BCL and OC conditions, a significant difference was
found (p < 0.001 for each comparison; Paired t-test, two
tailed).
FIGURE 4 | Results from the comparison between schizophrenics and
controls during OC condition. On the y axis, the OI of the OC condition
(observation of circles performed by an alien hand while performing lines)
expressed as % of the baseline condition (UL condition). Black bars represent
patients’ conditions while gray bars represent controls conditions. Error bars
represent standard errors of the mean (SEMs). ∗∗p < 0.01.
Correlations Results in Patients
We examined whether, in patients with schizophrenia, a relation
exists between the values obtained in BCL and OC conditions
and both SAPS and SANS global and subscales scores and the
Ownership/Agency ratings. The significant differences between
acute and stable patients in SAPS and SANS global and
subscales scores are reported in Table 1. With respect to the
Ownership/Agency ratings, no significant differences were found
between acute and stable patients (Ownership ratings ± SD;
Acute Patients: −1.95 ± 2.14; Stable Patients: −1.05 ± 2.2;
Agency ratings ± SD; Acute Patients: −0.55 ± 2.45; Stable
Patients: 0.1 ± 2.5; p > 0.3 for each comparison; Unpaired
t-test, two tailed). Correlation analysis showed that the OC
value was significantly related with SAPS global score and with
hallucinations and delusions subscales scores (SAPS global score:
r = 0.43, p = 0.03; SAPS Hallucinations subscale score: r = 0.56,
p = 0.01; SAPS Delusions subscale score r = 0.46, p = 0.04; see
Figure 5). Furthermore, OC values significantly correlated with
the ratings given by the patients at the Agency questionnaire:
‘‘The alien hand moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was
obeying my will’’ (r = 0.43, p = 0.05; see Figure 6). Finally,
a significant correlation existed between SAPS Hallucination
subscale scores and the Agency ratings (r = 0.44, p = 0.05;
see Figure 7). There were no significant correlation with SANS
global and subscales scores and with the ratings at the Ownership
questionnaire.
DISCUSSION
The present study is related to one of the most important
component of the human self-awareness; i.e., the sense of agency,
that is the sense of being the agent of a willed action (Gallagher,
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FIGURE 5 | Correlation between OC and scale for the assessment of
positive symptoms (SAPS) global and subscales scores. On the y axis,
the OI of the OC condition (observation of circles performed by an alien hand
while performing lines) expressed as % of the baseline condition (UL
condition). On the x axis, SAPS scores. Black squares represent comparison
of Observation C with SAPS hallucinations subscale scores (SAPS hal) while
gray triangles represent comparison of Observation C with SAPS delusion
subscale scores (SAPS del).
FIGURE 6 | Correlation between OC condition and agency rating
scores. On the y axis, the OI of the OC condition (observation of circles
performed by an alien hand while performing lines) expressed as % of the
baseline condition (UL condition). On the x axis, the agency rating scores.
2000; Jeannerod, 2003). In particular, we sought for evidence
that, in schizophrenia, an excessive sense of agency, for externally
generated actions, affects the patients’ motor parameters during
a bimanual circles-lines task.
The bimanual interference is a highly reproducible effect,
always present across different ages (Piedimonte et al., 2014),
induced by different tasks, in both spatial (e.g., Franz et al.,
1991) and temporal (e.g., Pia et al., 2013) domain. The neural
FIGURE 7 | Correlation between agency rating and SAPS
hallucinations subscale scores. On the y axis, the agency rating scores
while on the x axis, the SAPS hallucinations subscale scores (SAPS hal).
mechanism subserving this phenomenon is supposed to be the
default coupling of homologous muscles, promoted by the neural
crosstalk. Converging neuroimaging evidence show that, during
non-congruent bimanual movements (as those performed in
the circles-lines task), the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-
SMA) exerts an inhibitory function on this default coupling, thus
allowing the execution of non-congruent bimanual movements
(e.g., Sadato et al., 1997; Wenderoth et al., 2004; Garbarini et al.,
2013a).
In the present study, patients and controls showed a
comparable interference effect during the ‘‘classical’’ bimanual
version of the circles-lines task (i.e., no difference was found
between patients and controls for the OI enhancement in BCL
condition respect to UL condition). This suggest that, at least
in our schizophrenics sample, no motor abnormalities, specific
for bimanual tasks, can be described (neither in acute nor
in stable patients, showing a comparable interference effect in
BCL condition). On the contrary, in the observation version
of the task, the results showed a significant difference between
schizophrenics and controls. In particular, in schizophrenics,
respect to controls, we found a greater interference effect of
the examiner’s left hand movements, performing circles, on
the actual movements of the patients’ right hand, performing
lines. No significant difference in OC condition was found
between acute and stable patients, suggesting that the effect we
found does not depend on the phase of the illness. Crucially,
in patients, the interference enhancement was related to the
strength of the sense of agency reported during the task (the
patients’ rating at the Agency statement: ‘‘The alien hand
moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was obeying my
will’’).
Human’s sense of agency can be measured with at least
two different paradigms. An explicit paradigm consists in
asking participants to verbally indicate how much they sense
a feeling of control and of authorship over an action. An
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example of implicit paradigm to evaluate the sense of agency
is the ‘‘intentional binding’’ effect in subjective time experience
during an intentional action (Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Haggard
et al., 2002). As before mentioned (see ‘‘Introduction’’ Section),
both explicit and implicit paradigms have been employed in
schizophrenia. Daprati et al. (1997), asked the patients to execute
simple hand movements (without visual control) while showing,
in real time, a video of either own hand or an alien hand,
executing the same or a different movement. The patients’
sense of agency was explicitly evaluated by asking the patients
if they saw on the screen their own hand performing the
movement. They found that, hallucinating and deluded patients
with schizophrenia were more impaired in discriminating their
own hand from the alien one than the non-hallucinating ones,
and tended to misattribute the alien hand to themselves. Franck
et al. (2001) asked the patients to hold a joystick and to perform
discrete movements in different directions while showing them
the image of a virtual right hand holding a joystick. Angular
biases and temporal delays were randomly introduced in some
trials, such that the movement of the virtual hand departed
from the movement executed by the subjects. The patients’
sense of agency was explicitly evaluated by asking the patients
whether the movement they saw was their own. They found that,
compared with normal subjects, deluded schizophrenics made
significantly more recognition errors. On the other side, studies
employing the intentional binding, as an implicit measure of the
sense of agency, showed that patients feel both forward (when
the external events follow their intentional actions; Haggard
et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010) and backward (when the external
events precede their intentional actions; Maeda et al., 2012)
exaggerated causal efficacy (i.e., an hyper-sense of agency) in
the temporal event sequence during the intentional action. In
the present study, we investigated the sense of agency by jointly
employing both explicit (Agency rating) and implicit (OI value in
OC condition) measures, also showing a significant correlation
between them.
It is interesting to note that in the reviewed papers,
employing either explicit or implicit measure of the sense of
agency, a correlation with the positive symptoms, in particular
hallucinations and delusions, has been reported as crucial in
order for the effects of interest to occur (Daprati et al., 1997;
Franck et al., 2001; Voss et al., 2010; Maeda et al., 2012). Also in
our schizophrenics’ sample, a significant correlation was found
between positive symptoms (in particular hallucinations and
delusions as identified by SAPS hallucinations and delusions
subscales scores) and both the explicit and the implicit measure
of the sense of agency: the higher the positive symptoms, the
higher both the patients’ agency rating and the OI value in
OC condition. Positive symptoms could be defined as an excess
or a distortion of normal functions (thoughts, emotions or
behavior). Within the positive symptomatology, the patients
may attribute their own action or thought to an external
source, or they may experience the reverse as well; i.e., they
may perceive the others’ action as a consequence of their
own intentions and they may have the strong tendency to
‘‘bind’’ external events to their actions and feel they cause all
external phenomena around them. According to previous studies
(Daprati et al., 1997; Franck et al., 2001; Voss et al., 2010; Maeda
et al., 2012), our data provide experimental evidence supporting
the hypothesis that positive symptoms seem to be relevant to a
dysfunction of the awareness of action in schizophrenia.
Positive symptoms are typical of the acute stage of the
disease but can be present throughout the different phases of the
disorder. In our schizophrenics’ sample, although the positive
symptomatology was stronger in acute than in stable patients,
the correlations with positive symptoms (hallucinations and
delusions) were still significant also when the phases of the illness
(acute/stable) was controlled for.
The sense of agency has to be distinguished from a sense
of body-ownership, which is the perceptual condition that
allows the subject to ascribe body parts to oneself (Tsakiris
et al., 2007). The sense of agency and the sense of body-
ownership are fundamental components of self-awareness and
they interact in determining a conscious feeling of the self
as an acting body. Previous studies showed that patients with
schizophrenia have a more flexible body representation and
weakened sense of self. Thakkar et al. (2011) demonstrated
that watching a rubber hand being stroked, while one’s unseen
hand is stroked synchronously (i.e., the phenomenon known
as the Rubber Hand Illusion), can lead to qualitative (the
reported sense of ownership over the rubber hand) and
quantitative (a shift in perceived position of the real hand and
a limb-specific drop in stimulated hand temperature) stronger
effects in schizophrenics compared to controls. Ferri et al.
(2012) investigated the schizophrenics’ performance during an
implicit self-recognition task (visual matching), employing both
participant’s own and others’ body-effectors. Schizophrenics
did not show the typical self-advantage described in healthy
subjects (i.e., when the visual matching task involves the own
body-effectors, the healthy subjects’ accuracy is greater than
when it involves the others’ body-effectors). In our study,
we did not find any significant correlation with the patients’
rating at the Body-ownership statement: ‘‘I felt as if the alien
hand was my hand’’. This suggests that the interference effect
we found in OC conditions can be better explained by the
sense of agency (showing a significant correlation with the
OI parameter) than by the sense of ownership the patients
experienced during the task for the examiner’s hand drawing
circles.
In this balance between agency and ownership, the difference
between the results found in psychiatric and neurological
patients can be addressed. In schizophrenics, tested here, the
effect we found in the observation version of the circles-lines
task was not comparable to that found in the bimanual version
of the task (i.e., a significantly greater effect was found in BCL
condition then in OC condition). On the contrary, in brain-
damaged patients with pathological embodiment the interference
effect found in the observation task was very similar to that
found in healthy subjects actually performing bimanual Circles-
Lines task (i.e., no difference between BCL condition and OC
condition was found; see ‘‘Introduction’’ Section and for a full
description Garbarini et al., 2013b). During the observation task,
neurological patients with pathological embodiment showed a
profoundly altered sense of body ownership, claiming that the
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examiner’s hand drawing circles was their own hand. This
primary body-ownership deficit, in turn, affected the patients’
motor awareness and sense of agency (i.e., the patients ascribed
the examiner’s movement, drawing circles, to themselves). On
the contrary, schizophrenics were always conscious that, in the
experimental setting, the hand drawing circles was not their
own, although hallucinated and deluded patients reported to
feel as if ‘‘the alien hand moved just like they wanted it to,
as if it was obeying their will’’. However, what these data tell
us is that, both in neurological and in psychiatric patients, the
delusional beliefs are not mere verbal confabulations, but instead
have objective consequences on the patients’ motor performance.
In particular, in schizophrenics, we found that the greater the
patients’ agreement over the agency statement (‘‘The alien hand
moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was obeying my will’’), the
greater the modulation of the patients’ motor performance. We
can speculate that, in schizophrenics, the delusion of agency can
automatically trigger the intention-programming processes for
the own hand, as if the alien hand was actually ‘‘obeying to the
patients will’’, so that, when the examiner’s hand drew circles,
the lines drawn by the patients’ intact hand become ovalized.
In normal conditions, the feeling of being the agent of a
willed action is so self-evident and obvious that people think
there is nothing to explain about it. In fact, the study of
pathological conditions can reveal that the awareness of willed
action is build up in a complex way and that its coherence
can be severely and unexpectedly affected. The data discussed
here show that, in schizophrenia, an excessive sense of agency,
for externally generated actions, affects the patients’ motor
parameters during a bimanual circles-lines task. Compared
to controls, schizophrenics showed a significantly greater
interference effect of the examiners’ hand drawing circles on
the own hand drawing lines. This interference enhancement was
related to the strength of positive symptoms (SAPS global score
and with hallucinations and delusions subscales scores) and to
the sense of agency reported by the patients during the task
(Agency rating). These findings suggest that an altered sense
of agency, as shown by schizophrenics, can induce objective
consequences on the motor system.
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